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IS THE NORTH DAKOTA STATUTORY
REQUIREMENT THAT PHARMACIES BE
OWNED BY REGISTERED PHARMACISTS A
VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1963 a North Dakota legislative enactment amended
the requirements for the issuance of a permit to operate a
pharmacy.1  In effect the amendment limits the ownership
of pharmacies to registered pharmacists. The amendment
further provides that the board shall issue a permit to operate
a pharmacy upon satisfactory proof:
The applicant for such permit is qualified to con-
duct the pharmacy, and is a registered pharmacist in
good standing or is a partnership, each active member
of which is a registered pharmacist in good standing,
or a corporation or association, the majority stock in
which is owned by registered pharmacists in good
standing, actively and regularly employed in and re-
sponsible for the management, supervision, and opera-
tion of such pharmacy; .... 2
The requirement will have many ramifications. Because of
the economic issues involved the validity of the statute is
likely to be challenged. This challenge will be viewed with
nation wide-interest because of the amendment's direct effect
on chain stores having nation-wide outlets and corporate
ownership, and the now prevalent doctor-owned pharmacies.
Per se the constitutionality of the statute arises. Is this
enactment a denial of due process? Is it within the realm
of the State's police power? This note will be concerned
primarily with the latter question.
1. N.D. Cent. Code § 43-15-35 (Supp. 1963) provides: "The provision
of subsection 5 of this section shall not apply to the holder of a permit on
July 1, 1963, if otherwise qualified to conduct the pharmacy, provided that
any such permit holder who shall discontinue operation under such permit
or fail to renew such permit upon expiration shall not thereafter be ex-
empt from the provisions of such subsection as to such discontinued or
lapsed permit. The provisions of subsection 5 of this section shall not ap-
ply to hospital pharmacies furnishing service only to patients in such
hospital."
2. N.D. Cent. Code § 43-15-35 (5) (Supp. 1963).
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II. PRIOR LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION
In Liggett Co. v. Baldridge3 the Court declared a similar
Pennsylvania statute to be unconstitutional as in contra-
vention of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion
of the Court and stated:
. . . unless justified as a valid exercise of the
police power, the act assailed must be declared un-
constitutional because the enforcement thereof will
deprive appellant of its property without due process
of law . . . . it is made clear . . . that mere
stock ownership in a corporation, owning and operat-
ing a drug store, can have no real or substantial
relation to the public health; and that the act in
question creates an unreasonable and unnecessary
restriction upon private business.4
Upon the authority of Liggett v. Baldridge,5 the portions of
a New York statute forbidding the issuance of a pharmacy
permit to an owner not a licensed pharmacist was held
unconstitutional and void as in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
6
After the Liggett case,' state action requiring drug
store owners to be licensed pharmacists was limited. A
Michigan statute enacted in 1927 provides that every
pharmacy must be owned by a registered pharmacist and
that no partnership or corporation shall own a pharmacy
unless at least twenty-five per cent of all stock is owned by
pharmacists.8 The prior mentioned Pennsylvania and New
York statutes required all of the corporation stock holders
to be registered pharmacists. The North Dakota statute
requires that the majority stock in a corporation or association
be owned by registered pharmacists in good standing. 9
Statutes in all of the states and the District of Columbia
3. 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
4. I~d. at 111, 113.
5. 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
6. Pratter v. Lascoff, 140 Misc. 211, 249 N.Y.S. 211 (1931). Contra, In
Re Hauges, 140 Misc. 811, 252 N.Y.S. 81 (1931).
7. 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
8. Mich. Comp. Laws § 338.481 (1948). (No cases found reviewing con-
stitutionality of the statute.)
9. N.D. Cent. Code § 43-15-35 (5) (Supp. 1963).
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require the operation and management of a pharmacy by
a registered pharmacist.
A California statutory amendment,1° effective September
20, 1963, prohibits doctors (not including D.D.S.) from having
any membership, proprietary interest or co-ownership in a
pharmacy after June 1, 1967. Section Two 1 thereof provides
that the Board of Pharmacy shall not issue a new pharmacy
permit to doctors (not including D.D.S.). The statute does
not apply to a hospital pharmacy nor does it prohibit owner-
ship in a building in which a pharmacy is located where
space is leased at a prevailing rate either on a "straight
lease" or "percentage of the gross". 1 2
A recent Maryland statutory amendment 3 grants the
Commissioners of Pharmacy the authority to suspend or
revoke a pharmacist's license if he associates either as a
partner, co-owner, or employee of a pharmacy owned by a
physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other medical practitioner
or group thereof.
III. CHANGING POLICE POWER CONCEPTS
It is impossible to give the term police power an exact
definition or limitation.' 4  It has been defined as that power
inherent in every sovereignty to govern men and things
under which the legislature may, within constitutional limit-
ations, prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and
welfare of society and prescribe regulations to promote the
public health, morals, and safety; and to add to the general
public convenience, prosperity and welfare.15  Police power
"is not a rule; it is an evolution". 1 6  It is the "broadest in
scope of any field of governmental authority",' 7 and is the
"power to prevent, an anticipation of danger to come, ...
and restrain the individual tendency".' A large discretion
is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine not only
10. Calif. Sess. Laws 1963 ch. 1303 § 1.
11. Calif. Sess. Laws 1963 ch. 1303 § 2.
12. Calif. Sess. Laws 1963 ch. 1303 § 1.
13. Md. Code § 43: 266A (c) 4 (iii) (Supp. 1963).
14. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1873).
15. State v. Cromwell, 72 N.D. 565, 9 N.W.2d 914, 919 (1943).
16. State v. Cleveland, 47 N.M. 230, 141 P.2d 192, 200 (1943).
17. State v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 151 N.W. 331, 369 (1915).
18. Gilchrist Drug Co. v. City of Birmingham, 234 Ala. 204, 174 So. 609,
612 (1937); Mannix v. Frost, 100 Misc. 36, 164 N.Y.S. 1050, 1057 (1917).
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what the public interests require, but what measures are
necessary for the protection of such interests. 19  "The
police power . . . must be somewhat elastic in order to meet
changing . . . conditions which arise through the increase
of population and the complex commercial and social
relations of the people"; 20 and "can take private property
or limit its use when great public needs require, uncontrolled
by the constitutional requirement of due process". 21  Police
power can only be exercised by legislative enactment, and
it is within the legislature's discretion to determine when
public welfare or safety require its exercise. The courts
are authorized to interfere and declare a statute unconsti-
tutional only when it conflicts with the Constitution, and the
courts are not concerned with the wisdom, policy or necessity
of such an enactment. 2  Every enactmment is presumed
constitutional and every presumption in favor thereof will be
adopted. "And the courts will not declare a statute void
unless its invalidity is, in the judgment of the court, beyond
a reasonable doubt".2
The North Dakota Board of Pharmacy refused to issue
a pharmacy permit to a corporation because the owners were
not licensed pharmacists. The refusal was based on a Board
regulation which stated that a pharmacy must be owned
by registered pharmacists. The North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the Board regulation was an exercise of
legislative power by an administrative agency and, therefore,
void. 24
A state has broad power to establish and enforce
standards of conduct relative to the health of the public, and
its discretion in that field extends to the regulation of all
professions concerned with health. 25  A Massachusetts
statute prohibiting the practice of chiropractics was upheld
19. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); State v. Wagener, 77 Minn.
483, 80 N.W. 633, 635 (1899).
20. Graff v. Priest, 356 Mo. 401, 201 S.W.2d 945, 951 (1947).
21. Tropp v. Knickerbocker Village, 122 N.Y.S.2d 350, 359 (1953). But
see, Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). (due process places some
control).
22. City of Geneva v. Geneva Tel. Co., 30 Misc. 236, 62 N.Y.S. 172, 175
(1899).
23. Menz v. Coyle, 117 N.W.2d 290, 295 (N.D. 1962).
24. Medical Properties v. North Dakota Bd. of Pharm., 80 N.W.2d 87.
91 (N.D. 1956).
25. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954).
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as a valid exercise of the police power. 26  Courts generally
uphold the power of the state to regulate extensively the
medical 27 and dental26  professions and the related occupa-
tions of optometry2 9 and pharmacy.3 0 On the authority of
statutes and court decisions pharmacy has been declared a
profession .31
An analogy may be drawn between the pertinent North
Dakota statute and a Washington statute held to be a
reasonable exercise of the police power in State v. Boren.3 2
The statute involved prohibited the practice of dentistry
without a license and provided that a person practices
dentistry who owns, maintains or operates an office for the
practice of dentistry. State v. Boren33 overruled State v.
Brown3 4 which had held a statute requiring an examination
and license as prerequisites to owning, running, or managing
a dental office or department to be unconstitutional as not
being a proper exercise of the police power. In the Brown
case the court said:
It is solicitude for the physical well-being of the
public, . . . which justifies that part of the statute
providing for the examination and licensing of those
who desire to 'treat diseases or lesions of the human
teeth or of jaws or correct malpositions thereof.' To
perform such work with safety . . . . the opera-
tor must possess technical knowledge and skill pecul-
iar to the study and practice of dentistry. Can, the
same be said of one desiring to own, run, or manage
a dental office? We think not.3 5
26. Commonwealth v. Antonio, 333 Mass. 175, 129 N.E.2d 914 (1955).
27. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Beatty, 220 La. 1. 55 So.
2d 761 (1951); Mann v. Board of Medical Examiners, 31 Cal. 2d 30, 187 P.2d
1 (1947).
28. People v. Carroll, 274 Mich. 451, 264 N.W. 861 (1936); State v. Bailey
Dental Co., 211 Iowa 781, 234 N.W. 260 (1931).
29. Sanchick v. Michigan State Bd. of Exam. In Optom., 342 Mich. 555.
70 N.W.2d 757 (1955); Klien v. Department of Registration and Educ., 412
Ill. 75, 105 N.E.2d 758 (1952).
30. People v. Baker, 332 Mich. 320, 51 N.W.2d 240 (1952); State v. Wood.
51 S.D. 485, 215 N.W. 487 (1927); State v. Hovorka, 100 Minn. 249, 110 N.W.
870 (1907).
31. La. Rev. Stat. § 37:1206 (Supp. 1960); 59 La. Stat. Tit. 59 § 353.2
(1961); Lee v. Gaddy, 183 So. 4, 6 (Fla. 1938); Sashihara v. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 46 P.2d 804, 805 (Calif. 1935).
32. 36 Wash. 2d 522, 219 P.2d 566 (1950), appeal dismissed 340 U.S. 881
(1950).
33. Ibid.
34. 37 Wash. 97, 79 P. 635 (1905).
35. State v. Brown, 37 Wash. 97, 79 P. 635, 637 (1905).
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The court concluded that the health, moral, or physical
welfare of the public is not endangered by the ownership and
management of a dental office, so long as the actual dental
work is done by those qualified and licensed by law.3 6
In overruling State v. Brown,37 the Washington court
declared in the Boren"8 case that it agreed with the general
statement made in the Brown case that "to own and manage
property is a natural right," but--that there was a clear
distinction between the right of the state to interfere with
the owning and managing of property, as such, and its right
under its police power to protect the health of its people.
The care and treatment of the teeth requires a personal
relationship between dentist and patient, and the services of
a trained expert. Dentistry is not a business or a commercial
transaction but is a profession, the regulation of which is a
duty of the state. The state has decided that the statutory
regulation considered here is necessary to protect the health
of the people. Clearly, such a regulation is a reasonable
exercise of its police power.3 9
State ex rel. Standard Optical Co. v. Superior Court"
was a quo warranto proceeding charging the defendant
corporation with unlawfully practicing optometry. The
corporation operated a store which was in the sole charge of
a licensed optometrist employed and paid by the corporation.
The corporation exercised no control over the optometrists'
professional judgment. The court, in holding that the course
of business followed by the corporation constituted the unlaw-
ful practice of optometry, stated that if such a course were
sanctioned corporations might practice law, medicine, dentist-
ry or any other profession by the simple expedient of
employing licensed agents. If this were permitted profes-
sional standards could be destroyed, and professions requiring
special training would be commercialized to the public
detriment.4 '
In State v. Williams,42 a statute declaring that one who
36. Id. at 638.
37. 37 Wash. 97, 79 P. 635 (1905).
38. State v. Boren, supra note 32.
39. State v. Boren, 36 Wash. 2d 522, 219 P.2d 566, 572 (1950).
40. 17 Wash. 2d 323, 135 P.2d 839 (1943).
41. State ex rel. Standard Optical Co. v. Superior Court, supra note 40.
42. 211 Ind. 186, 5 N.E.2d 961 (1937).
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owned, operated, managed or conducted a dental office was
engaged in the practice of dentistry, was held to be within
the police power of the state. The court declared that if a
person or association of persons unqualified to become licensed
as dentist can own, manage and operate a dental office with
a licensed dentist in charge, then all the statutes regulating
the practice of dentistry would be of no effect. The standards
and ethics of the dental office, the class of workmanship and
the price would be regulated by the owner. If the owner
could select and rent the office and employ the licensed
dentist to do the actual work, he would be doing a dental
business and would be doing indirectly what he could not do
directly.4 3
In a California case 44 involving similar regulations the
appellant contended there was a distinction between the
practice of dentistry which the statute undertook to regulate
and the purely business side of the practice. The court
held that to make such a distinction was impractical. To
hold otherwise would allow the proprietor of the business to
be guilty of such misconduct as to violate standards which
a licensed dentist is required to respect and allow him
immunity from regulatory supervision. His employee, the
licensed dentist, would also be immune upon the ground that
he was a mere employee and not responsible for his
employer's acts. The right of a person merely to own a
dental office not being involved, the question was whether
the thing owned was used for an intended purpose by a
person lawfully licensed to so use it. An unlicensed owner
would possibly have less regard for the employees' skill than
would a licensed owner charged with the obligation he
assumes with respect to the standards of his profession. 45
In Messner v. Board of Dental Examiners46 the court
stated: "The power to hire and discharge and to fix the
compensation of an employee necessarily implies the power
to control his work."
It is submitted that the state regulation of dentistry and
43. State v. Williams, supra note 42, at 966.
44. Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932).
45. Ibld.
46. 87 Cal. App. 199, 262 P. 588 (1927).
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optometry, as discussed in the foregoing cases, is analogous
to the state regulation of pharmacy exemplified by the North
Dakota statute under discussion.
A change in the attitude of the Supreme Court concerning
the discretion afforded state legislatures in regulating
businesses in the exercise of the police power is indicated by
contrasting some aspects of the 1905 case of Lochner v. New
York4 and the Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.48 case decided
in 1955. In the Lochner case a statute limiting the number
of hours to be worked each week by bakers was held
unconstitutional. The Court stated:
Statutes . . . , limiting the hours in which
grown . . . men may labor to earn their living,
are mere meddlesome interferences with the rights
of the individual, and they are not saved from con-
demnation by the claim that they are passed in the
exercise of the police power . . . . unless there
be some fair ground, reasonable in and of itself,
to say that there is material danger to the public
health or to the health of the employees; if the hours
of labor are not curtailed. If this be not clearly the
case the individuals, whose rights are thus made the
subject of legislative interference, are under the pro-
tection of the Federal Constitution . . . ; and the
legislature of the State has no power to limit their
right . . . . (emphasis added.) 49
Here the burden of justification was placed upon the state
and in effect required that regulatory laws be held invalid
unless their relation to public welfare is clearly shown.
In Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. 5 0 the Court upheld a
statute inter alia prohibiting duplication of lenses by an
optician without a prescription from an optometrist or an
oculist. Plaintiff opticians contended that this provision
deprived them of a valuable business without conferring any
benefit upon the public. In reversing the judgment of the
three-judge district court, 51 which had admitted extensive
47. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
48. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
49. Supra note 47, at 61.
50. Supra note 48.
51. Lee Optical Co. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Okla. 1954).
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expert testimony to support the plaintiff's contention, the
Supreme Court said:
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
strike down state laws, regulatory of business
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of
harmony with a particular school of thought .
'For protection against abuses by legislatures the
people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.'
52
The . . . law may exact a needless, wasteful
requirement in many cases. But it is for the legis-
lature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and
disadvantages of the new requirement ....
When it is necessary to duplicate a lens, a written
prescription may or may not be necessary. But the
legislature might have concluded that one was needed
often enough to require one in every case. Or
t that eye examinations were so critical, .
that . . . every duplication of a lens should be
accompanied by a prescription from a medical expert
. . . . It is enough that there is an evil at hand
for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to
correct it.53
This places a prodigious burden upon the party attacking
the law. He must show that no basis for the law exists in
fact and that the legislature could not in good faith believe
such a need exists.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that since
the Liggett54 decision the consensus has been that regulations
demanding pharmacy licensure of pharmacy owners would
be invalid.
A test of the validity of statutes similar to the previously
mentioned California statute 5 would emphasize different
issues than a test of the validity of the North Dakota statute.
52. Supra note 48, at 488, quoting from Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 11&
134 (1876).
53. Supra note 48, at 487, 488.
54. 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
55. Calif. Sess. Laws 1963 ch. 1303 § 1.
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Opponents may be more hesitant to test the validity of the
California statute. One possible issue involved in the doctor-
ownership of a pharmacy would be that of anti-trust infringe-
ment. The attendent publicity would emphasize the price-
fixing possibilities where the physician writes and fills the
prescription. What effect would this have on the medical
profession's public image? Another issue is restraint of
trade. It seems apparent that the question involved here
is not whether the statute would create a monopoly for
pharmacists but whether or not the doctor-owned pharmacy
poses a definite threat to the existence of the pharmacy
profession. Does this threat come within the purview of
the state's police power?
The broad scope of the North Dakota statute" could
bring into issue many varied limitations and extensions of
the state's police power. The professional and ethical
standards of pharmacy demand the pharmacist's concern for
the quantity and quality of stock and equipment. A drug
which has deteriorated because of improper storage facilities
can be a detriment to public welfare. The drug not in stock
poses a threat to the individual who needs it now.
The owner of a pharmacy is very influential in determining
what, when and where stock and equipment is purchased.
What effect can a nonpharmacist owner have on the practice
of pharmacy which would be detrimental to the public health
and welfare? It is submitted that the effect is extensive
enough to require regulation.
HOWARD A. OLSON
56. N.D. Cent. Code § 43-15-35 (Supp. 1963).
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